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P r op osit ion 1 : Under complete information the optimal shares of work hours in public
production can be characterized as follows:
(i) when θ θ/ ρ, then if S is low, p∗ and
S ν p∗ ρ λ θ
ρ
and if S is high, p∗ and
Sν p∗ ν ρ λ θ.
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P r op osit ion 2 : i) When ρ is small ρ < ρa , optimal regulation under asymmetric informa-
tion entails a pooling mechanism p∗∗ p∗∗ p∗∗ characterized by
S ν ν ρ p∗∗ λ νθ ν θ λν θ
ν ρ ν
.
i i) When ρ is large ρ ρa optimal regulation under asymmetric information entails:
i f S is low, p∗∗ and
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P r op osit ion 3 : When θ θ/ ρ, optimal regulation under incomplete information entails
I f S is low, p∗∗ and








I f S is high, p∗∗ and
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P r op osit ion 4 Optimal regulation entails:
(i) When ρ ρa, then if S is low, p∗∗∗ and















and if S is high, then p∗∗∗ p∗∗ and p∗∗∗ p∗∗.
(i i) When ρac < ρ < ρa, then if S is low, p∗∗∗ and p∗∗∗ is the solution of (12). I f
S is high, p∗∗∗ and
S ν ρ ν p∗∗∗ λ θ.
(i i i) When ρ < ρac, then p∗∗∗ p∗∗∗ p∗∗∗ and
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P r op osit ion 5 : I f workers are risk averse and discover their types after accepting the down-
sizing mechanism, the optimal mechanism can be characterized as follows:
(i) When λ ρθ λ θ λ ν1− ν θ

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
, then if S is low,
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and if S is high, p∗∗∗∗ and p∗∗∗∗ is the solution of (5).
(i i) When λ ρθ < λ θ λ ν1− ν θ
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, then p∗∗∗∗ p∗∗∗∗
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